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Abstract This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining
model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining
protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players’ shares in the surplus are
determined sequentially rather than simultaneously. The protocol also assumes orderly
voting, a restriction on the order in which players respond to a proposal. The bargain-
ing protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to be implemented. Unlike
all existing bargaining protocols with unanimous agreement, the resulting game has
unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of the discount factor. The
result builds on the analysis of so-called one-dimensional bargaining problems. We
show that also one-dimensional bargaining problems have unique subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities for any value of the discount factor.
Keywords Noncooperative bargaining · Dynamic games ·
Subgame perfect equilibrium · Unanimous agreement
JEL Classification C78
1 Introduction
In many socioeconomic problems, parties can create a surplus by collaborating. Bar-
gaining problems study the distribution of the surplus over the parties involved. In the
strategic theory of bargaining, a detailed process of negotations concerning the surplus
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is described, which is then analyzed by the tools of game theory. A commonly studied
negotiation process is the one of alternating offers bargaining, first studied by Ståhl
(1972) under the assumption of an exogenous deadline, next extended by Rubinstein
(1982) to the case of an infinite horizon.
In the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model there are two players. The game has
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium under weak assumptions. This analysis does
not carry over to bargaining problems with n players. As reported in Osborne and
Rubinstein (1990), a first extension to the n-person case is due to Shaked and consists
of an example involving three players. In this example, player 1 starts by making a
public proposal about splitting the surplus to the other two players. A proposal consists
of specifying a share in the surplus for each of the players. The other players must
accept or reject this proposal sequentially. If all agree, the proposal is implemented,
otherwise it is rejected, one period of time elapses, and the next player makes a new
proposal. Bargaining continues in this way. Herrero (1985) and Haller (1986) show
that there is no unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the n-person case if the dis-
count factor is sufficiently high. In particular, any feasible agreement is supported by
a subgame perfect equilibrium, and equilibria with arbitrarily long delay exist.
Alternative extensions of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model are given by Jun
(1987); Chae and Yang (1988); Yang (1992); Chae and Yang (1994); Krishna and
Serrano (1996); Huang (2002), and Suh and Wen (2006). These authors consider
games with partial agreement, also referred to as exit games. In an exit game, players
need not agree unanimously to a proposal. In case of partial agreement, those players
who have accepted the proposal may exit the game with the shares awarded by the
proposer. These papers reproduce the basic results of the 2-player case for the n-player
case. Under weak assumptions, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, and in
this equilibrium agreement is reached without delay.
This paper studies n-person bargaining problems where unanimous agreement of
all players is needed before an agreement can be implemented. The case where the
members of an n-person coalition together generate a surplus that has to be shared is
naturally analyzed by a bargaining game with unanimous agreement, where it is not
allowed for players to leave the bargaining table with only partial agreements of others.
Indeed, coalitions are very often thought of as being based on unanimous consent, see
for instance Hart and Kurz (1983, p. 1060). Another example concerns a firm that is
unable to pay its debts and files with a federal bankruptcy court for protection under
Chapter 11. When Chapter 11 results in the reorganization of the firm’s assets, all the
firm’s creditors have to approve of the reorganization plan. As a final example, we
would like to mention jury trials, where juries have to reach a unanimous verdict in
order to convict a defendant.
Since allocation mechanisms that have many equilibria are undesirable, the question
addressed in this paper is whether we can design bargaining protocols with unanimous
agreement having unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. This paper answers
this question affirmatively. This conclusion is strikingly different from all the existing
multilateral bargaining protocols with unanimous agreement. The crucial distinguish-
ing feature of the proposed class of bargaining protocols is that players’ shares are
not discussed simultaneously, but rather sequentially. A proposal does therefore not
consist of the specification of the shares of all players simultaneously, but rather the
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specification of the share of a single player, referred to as the player on the agenda.
Once this player’s share has been approved of by all players remaining on the agenda,
bargaining proceeds by determining the share of the next player on the agenda, and so
on until all the shares have been decided upon. We refer to a bargaining protocol with
this distinguishing feature as a sequential share bargaining protocol. Players whose
share has not been decided yet are referred to as players remaining on the agenda.
The class of sequential share bargaining protocols allows for a wide variety of pro-
tocols. Apart from the feature that players’ shares are discussed one at a time, the main
requirement is the one of orderly voting. Orderly voting means that in each period the
player whose share is discussed is either the proposer or the last player to respond
to a proposal. In determining the share of player a, it is natural to think about player
a as being involved in a bargaining situation involving two coalitions. One coalition
consists of player a himself, the other coalition of the other players remaining on the
agenda. All players in the second coalition share a preference for making the share
awarded to player a as small as possible. The assumption of orderly voting can there-
fore be interpreted as the requirement that a proposer first seeks approval within his
own coalition, followed by approval of all the players in the opposing coalition.
To solve the sequential share bargaining game, we study so-called one-dimensional
bargaining problems. A one-dimensional bargaining problem consists of two coali-
tions S and T that bargain over the choice of x in an interval [0, r ]. The utility functions
of the players in S are identical and monotonically increasing in x . The utility functions
of the players in T are identical too, but monotonically decreasing in x .
Although we need the one-dimensional bargaining problem as a building block to
obtain results for sequential share bargaining, one-dimensional bargaining problems
are worth studying in their own right. Many real-life bargaining situations can be
approximated by the case where the bargaining space is one-dimensional, the players
involved can be partitioned in two groups, with preferences within the group identi-
cal, and between groups diametrically opposed. Examples include the division of a
fixed budget over two possible goals, the location of a public facility on a line, and
negotiations between two firms (where a firm is viewed upon as a collection of agents
with identical preferences) or between a firm and an individual about the price of a
product or a service. One-dimensional bargaining problems are also studied in Banks
and Duggan (2000); Imai and Salonen (2000); Cho and Duggan (2003); Cardona and
Ponsatí (2007), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010).
We show that one-dimensional bargaining leads to unique subgame perfect equi-
librium utilities when the requirement of orderly voting is satisfied. In the context of
one-dimensional bargaining, orderly voting means that the coalition members of the
proposer respond before the members in the opposing coalition. We provide a lin-
ear system of characteristic equations that makes the computation of an equilibrium
strategy profile an easy task. All existing uniqueness results in the one-dimensional
bargaining literature (Imai and Salonen 2000; Cho and Duggan 2003; Cardona and
Ponsatí 2007; Herings and Predtetchinski 2010) need the much stronger concept of
subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies. Surprisingly, in our model sub-
game perfection suffices to obtain unique predictions.
From our results on one-dimensional bargaining problems, we derive that the
subgame perfect equilibrium utilities in sequential share bargaining are uniquely
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determined by means of the following induction argument. Clearly, sequential share
bargaining problems where the set of players remaining on the agenda is a singleton
have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. Consider a sequential share bar-
gaining game where the set of players remaining on the agenda has cardinality n + 1.
For all its subgames where the set of players remaining on the agenda has cardinality n,
one can substitute the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. The result-
ing reduced sequential share bargaining game belongs to the class of one-dimensional
bargaining problems, having unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. Moreover,
the equilibria in sequential share bargaining games are characterized by absence of
delay.
Section 2 introduces an illustrative example to highlight how the principle of deter-
mining shares one by one avoids the huge multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria
that is common in multilateral bargaining with unanimous agreement. Section 3 intro-
duces the class of sequential share bargaining protocols and claims that for any such
protocol subgame perfect equilibrium utilities are unique. Section 4 introduces the one-
dimensional bargaining problem and Sect. 5 its characteristic equations. In Sect. 6 it is
shown that the one-dimensional bargaining problem leads to unique subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities. Building on the result of Sect. 6, it is shown in Sect. 7 that sequen-
tial share bargaining leads to unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. Section 8
concludes.
2 An example
As an illustrative example we consider the case where a set of three players, N =
{1, 2, 3}, bargains over the division of a surplus of size 1. The three players rotate
in making proposals, starting with player 1. A proposal x ∈ R3+ satisfies that x1 +
x2 + x3 = 1. After a proposal by player i, player i + 1 responds by an acceptance
or a rejection. In case of an acceptance by player i + 1, it is player i + 2’s turn to
accept or reject the proposal by player i. If both responders accept the proposal, it is
implemented. Otherwise, after the first rejection of the proposal by player i, player
i +1 makes a proposal at time t +1, and so on, and so forth. A proposal x accepted in
period t yields a utility of δt x j to player j = 1, 2, 3, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common
discount factor. As reported in Binmore et al. (1992), for every proposal x there exists
a subgame perfect equilibrium in which x is accepted immediately whenever the dis-
count factor is greater than or equal to 1/2. This result stands in sharp contrast to the
two-player case, where Rubinstein (1982) has shown the uniqueness of a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
The bargaining game of the previous paragraph admits a unique subgame perfect




1 + δ + δ2 ,
δ
1 + δ + δ2 ,
δ2
1 + δ + δ2
)
,
and this proposal is accepted by both players 2 and 3.
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We argue that the extreme multiplicity of equilibria can be avoided by choosing an
appropriate bargaining procedure. In particular, a procedure where players’ shares are
discussed sequentially rather than simultaneously does not suffer from multiplicity
of subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. Consider again the case where a set of three
players N = {1, 2, 3} has to bargain over the division of a surplus of size 1. The
players’ shares are now not discussed simultaneously, but rather one at a time. As an
illustration, we consider the case where the players start bargaining over the share to
be received by player 3, so player 3 is the first player on the agenda, followed by the
share of player 2, so player 2 is the second player on the agenda. What is left can be
claimed by player 1, the last player on the agenda. Therefore, initially the set of players
remaining on the agenda is R = {1, 2, 3}, after player 3’s share is agreed upon by all
players in R, the set of players remaining on the agenda becomes R′ = {1, 2}, and
after player 2’s share is agreed upon by all players in R′, the set of players remaining
on the agenda becomes R′′ = {1}.
To determine the share of the player on the agenda, players rotate in making propos-
als. For the sake of the example, we assume that player 1 starts by making a proposal
x13 for the share player 3 should obtain. In case of a rejection by player 2 or player 3,
player 2 is next to make a proposal x23 for the share of player 3, followed by a proposal
x33 by player 3 in case of a rejection by player 1 or player 2. We assume that a proposal
of player 1 is followed by a response by player 2, and if positive, by a response by
player 3. Similarly, a proposal by player 2 is followed by a response by player 1, and
if positive, by a response by player 3. Finally, after a proposal by player 3, player 1
responds first, followed by player 2. After the acceptance of the share x3 for player 3
by all the players, players 1 and 2 continue bargaining over the share of player 2.
Again, player 1 starts by making a proposal, followed by player 2 in case of a rejec-
tion, and so on, and so forth. After the acceptance of the share x2 for player 2, player 1
makes a (rather trivial) proposal for his share x1. One period of time elapses after
every rejection.
The proposal of player i for the share of player a who is currently on the agenda is
denoted xia . The set of shares of player a approved of by player i when proposed by
player j is denoted Aiaj . For the moment we restrict attention to stationary strategies.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize a profile of strategies that is, as is shown in this paper,
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the players’ strategies in the sub-
games where R = N . In such subgames it is player 3 who is on top of the agenda,
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i = 1 δ1+δ (1 − x3) ∗
[
0, 11+δ (1 − x3)
]
i = 2 11+δ (1 − x3)
[
δ
1+δ (1 − x3), 1 − x3
]
∗
hence a = 3. The first entry in row i of the table lists player i’s proposal x¯ i3 for the share





for the shares of player 3 when proposed by player 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Since a
proposer does not respond to his own proposal, a ∗ is used to denote the corresponding
entry. Table 2 summarizes the players’ strategies in subgames corresponding to R′,
where player 3 has received a share x3. In such subgames it is player 2 who is on the
agenda, so a = 2. The table lists player i’s proposal x¯ i2 for the share of player 2, as
well as player i’s acceptance set Ai2 j for player 2’s share when proposed by the other
player.
In subgames corresponding to R′′, player 3 has received a share x3, and player 2 a
share x2, the proposal of player 1 for his own share is given by
x¯11 = 1 − x2 − x3.
In this equilibrium, first player 3 receives a share x3 = x¯13 = δ2/(1 + δ + δ2),
followed by player 2 receiving x2 = x¯12 = δ(1 − x¯13)/(1 + δ) = δ/(1 + δ + δ2), and
finally player 1 receives x1 = x¯11 = 1 − x¯12 − x¯13 = 1/(1 + δ + δ2).
Notice that the equilibrium strategy profile is stationary. Could there be other sub-
game perfect equilibria? We show in this paper that all subgame perfect equilibria of
the sequential bargaining game lead to the same equilibrium utilities.
We present the main idea behind the uniqueness proof for the example. The proof is
by induction on the number of players remaining on the agenda. Any subgame where
the set of remaining players is {1, 2} is the familiar 2-player game with alternating
offers, with 1 − x3 > 0 being the size of the cake still available for players 1 and
2. The results of Rubinstein (1982) apply and show that any such subgame has the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium described by Table 2. We now replace all such
two-player subgames by their respective subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. In the
reduced game thus obtained if player 3 is allocated a share x3 of the cake in period 0,
the payoffs to the players 1, 2, and 3 are given by the vector
(
1
1 + δ (1 − x3),
δ
1 + δ (1 − x3), x3
)
.
In the reduced game, players 1 and 2 have the same preferences over the outcomes
of the game, the observation that is central to the proof of the uniqueness of sub-
game perfect equilibrium payoffs. Such a game can be thought of as one-dimensional
bargaining game, played by the player 3 against the coalition T = {1, 2}.
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Subgame perfect equilibrium utilities can be shown to be unique in all such one-
dimensional bargaining games where the remainder of the surplus 1 − x3 is strictly
positive. The formal argument is given in Theorem 6.1 and consists of an extension
of proof strategy of Binmore (1987). Other subgames can be argued not to be reached
on the equilibrium path.
The subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of the reduced game are computed as




1 − x33 = δ(1 − x13).
The first of these equations is the condition that player 3 is indifferent between the
acceptance and the rejection of the proposal x13 of player 1. The second equation is
the condition that player 3 is indifferent between the acceptance and the rejection of
the proposal x23 of player 2. The third equation is the condition that the players 1 and
2 are indifferent between the acceptance and the rejection of the proposal x33 of player
3. The unique solution to the system is the vector (x¯13 , x¯23 , x¯33) given by Table 1.
Though the procedure with less and less players remaining on the agenda might give
the impression that the basic argument is identical to the one for procedures that do not
require unanimous approval, such is not the case. Indeed, apart from the sequentiality
of the procedure, the uniqueness result also depends crucially on the order in which
players respond. The latter feature plays no role in procedures that do not insist on
unanimous agreement.
Consider the same sequential share bargaining procedure as before, but with a
different voting order in case R = N and a proposal is made by player 1, where
now player 3 responds before player 2. The subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
profile of the original sequential share bargaining procedure is still a subgame per-
fect equilibrium here. However, now there are also subgame perfect equilibria giv-
ing rise to different equilibrium utilities. In fact, immediate agreement on any share
x3 ∈ [δ2/(1 + δ + δ2), (1 + δ2)/(1 + δ + δ2)] for player 3 is supported by some
subgame perfect equilibrium whenever 2δ3 ≥ 1, which is for instance the case if δ
exceeds 0.8.1
3 Sequential share bargaining
We consider the problem of dividing a surplus of size X among a set of N players. The
cardinality of N is denoted by n. In the standard modeling approach, players make
proposals that consist of the specification of the entire allocation of the surplus. Here,
on the contrary, players’ shares are discussed one at a time, and a proposal consists of
the specification of the share of the particular player who is currently on the agenda.
The players whose share has not been determined yet are called players remaining
1 A formal proof of this statement is available upon request from the authors.
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on the agenda and are denoted by R ⊂ N . A player’s share is determined once it is
approved of by all players remaining on the agenda.
Potentially there are many ways regarding the order in which the players’ shares
could be discussed. One possibility would be a fixed sequence, another would be that
the player whose share is going to be determined next is drawn according to a uniform
probability distribution from the set of players remaining on the agenda. Both alterna-
tives are captured by our specification that assigns to each potential set R of players
remaining on the agenda a probability distribution ρ(R) determining for each player
in R the probability that his share is going to be discussed next. The probability that
player a ∈ R is the next one on the agenda is therefore equal to ρa(R). We denote
the tuple of probability distributions ρ(R) for non-empty subsets R of N by ρ. The
example where shares are discussed in a fixed sequence i1, . . . , in is obtained by set-
ting, for j = 1, . . . , n, ρi j ({i j , . . . , in}) = 1 and ρi ({i j , . . . , in}) = 0 for i = i j . In
this case, there are only n sets R that matter. The example where the next player on the
agenda is selected according to a uniform probability distribution follows from setting
ρi (R) = 1/|R| for each ∅ = R ⊂ N and i ∈ R, where |R| denotes the cardinality
of R.
Given the choice of the player on the agenda, we use a standard bargaining process
to determine his share. One of the players in R is chosen as proposer, all the other
players respond sequentially. As soon as one of them disagrees, a new player in R is
chosen to be the proposer. One standard bargaining protocol chooses proposers in a
rotating order, as in Rubinstein (1982) or Haller (1986), another chooses proposers
from the set of players remaining on the agenda according to some time-invariant
probability distribution as in Binmore (1987) or Banks and Duggan (2000). Both pro-
tocols are special cases of our approach, where following Kalandrakis (2004) and
Herings and Predtetchinski (2010) we assume that the selection of the proposer is
determined by a Markov process with the set R of players remaining on the agenda as
the state space. The transition probabilities of the process are given by the irreducible
transition matrix π(R), so πi j (R) is the probability that the next proposer is player
j if the current proposer is player i. The probability distribution π0(R) determines
the initial proposer. The tuple of transition matrices π(R) for non-empty subsets R
of N is denoted by π and the tuple of probability distributions π0(R) by π0. The
example where, given a set of players remaining on the agenda R with cardinality
r, proposers are chosen in the rotating order i1, . . . , ir , i1 follows from specifying
πi j i j+1(R) = 1 for j = 1, . . . , r, and πi j (R) = 0 otherwise. When player j ∈ R is
selected with probability π j according to a time-invariant probability distribution, we
set πi j (R) = π j for all i, j ∈ R.
We now describe the sequential share bargaining game  = (N , X, δ, ρ, π0, π)
more formally. We define a state as the tuple s = (R, x−R, t, a, i), where ∅ = R ⊂ N
is the set of players remaining on the agenda, x−R are the unanimously agreed upon
shares of the players in N \ R, t ∈ Z+ is the time period, a ∈ R is the player on the
agenda, and i ∈ R is the proposer.
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At the beginning of the game, player a ∈ N is chosen to be the first player on the
agenda with probability ρa(N ) and i ∈ N is chosen to be the first proposer with prob-
ability π0i (N ), so the first state is (N , x−N , 0, a, i) with probability ρa(N )π0i (N ).2
In each state (R, x−R, t, a, i), player i proposes some share xa of the surplus to
player a. It should hold that xa ≥ 0 and xa ≤ X − ∑ j∈N\R x j . All players in R\{i}
respond sequentially to the proposal. The voting order may depend on all the parame-
ters describing the state and in fact on the entire history of play, as long as the property
of orderly voting is satisfied.
Definition 3.1 A sequential share bargaining game satisfies orderly voting if at every
state s = (R, x−R, t, a, i) it holds that either i = a or i = a and player i is the last
one to respond.
Players can either accept or reject the proposal. As soon as the first rejection takes
place, a transition to state (R, x−R, t + 1, a, j) occurs with probability πi j (R). If no
rejection occurs, so all players accept the proposal, player a receives the proposed
share xa , the set of players remaining on the agenda becomes R′ = R \{a}, and a
transition to state (R′, x−R′ , t, a′, j) occurs with probability ρa′(R′)π0j (R′).
Notice that in the course of the game each state is visited at most once. The game
terminates as soon as there are no more players on the agenda. The utility of a player a
receiving share xa is equal to δt xa, where t is the period in which the game terminates
and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor. In the case of perpetual disagreement,
the utility is equal to zero for all players.
The main result of this paper is that sequential share bargaining games with orderly
voting have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. The gist of the argument
is as follows. A subgame in state s = (R, x−R, t, a, i) starting with a proposal by
player i is denoted by (s). All sequential share bargaining games (R, x−R, t, a, a)
such that the set R contains a single player are trivial and have trivial subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities equal to δt x−R and δt (X − ∑ j∈N\R x j ). Subgames where the set
R consists of more than one player and X − ∑ j∈N\R x j = 0 are less trivial, since
there are no incentives for the remaining players in R to agree, causing a multiplicity
of subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of the other players. We will argue that such
subgames are not reached on the equilibrium path.
Suppose we have shown that all games (s) with orderly voting have unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium utilities whenever s is a state with m − 1 players remaining
on the agenda and the remainder of the surplus is strictly positive.
Consider a game in (s) where s = (R, x−R, t, a, i) with R containing m play-
ers. For 0 ≤ xa ≤ X − ∑ j∈N\R x j we replace all subgames in (R \ {a}, X −∑
j∈N\R x j − xa, t ′, a′, i ′) of the game (R, x−R, t, a, i) by their subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities. For xa = X − ∑ j∈N\R x j , we select subgame perfect equilib-
rium utilities arbitrarily. The resulting reduced game is denoted ˆ(s). As we show in
the proof of Theorem 7.1, the game ˆ(s) is a so-called one-dimensional bargaining
game with orderly voting, played by coalitions S = {a} and T = R\{a}. Subgame per-
fect equilibrium utilities of ˆ(s) are therefore unique by Theorem 6.1, and are found
2 We have included x−N to avoid notational confusion.
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using the characteristic equations that we develop for the one-dimensional bargaining
game. It now follows that the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of  are unique.
4 One-dimensional bargaining
This section studies one-dimensional bargaining with unanimous agreement. In a one-
dimensional bargaining game ˆ, a finite set of players N has to agree on the choice
of x in a non-degenerate interval [0, r ]. The n players in N are partitioned in the
non-empty coalitions S and T . All players in S have identical preferences that are
monotonically increasing in x on [0, r). All players in T have identical preferences
that are monotonically decreasing in x on [0, r ].
The game ˆ is a dynamic game of perfect information in discrete time. At each
time period t = 0, 1, . . . a proposer is selected from the set N . The selected player
makes a proposal, i.e. a choice for x in the interval [0, r ]. We denote the proposal by
player i by xi . All the remaining players respond, sequentially, to the proposal. Either
a proposal is unanimously accepted, it is implemented, and the game ends. Or some
player rejects the proposal, period t + 1 begins, and nature selects a new proposer. An
outcome of the game is either perpetual disagreement or a pair (t, x), i.e. x is agreed
upon in period t .
The selection of the proposer is determined by a Markov process with state space
N . The transition probabilities of the process are given by the irreducible transition
matrix π(N ). Thus πi j (N ) is the probability of a transition from state i to state j, i.e.
if the last proposer has been player i, then with probability πi j the next proposer is
player j. The first proposer is a player i0 ∈ N .
The players in coalition S have identical preferences over outcomes. The utility of
a player i ∈ S who receives outcome x ∈ [0, r) in period t is ui (t, x) = δt x, where
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor. The utility of receiving outcome r in period
t may depend on the entire history of play and might be any value less than or equal
to δt r. The utility of perpetual disagreement is 0. Similarly, the players in T have
identical preferences. The utility of a player i ∈ T who receives outcome x ∈ [0, r ]
in period t is ui (t, x) = δt (r − x). The utility of perpetual disagreement is 0.
The reason for the slight asymmetry in the description of the preferences of mem-
bers of coalitions S and T is that we want to apply the results for the one-dimensional
bargaining model to the sequential share bargaining model. When a player in the
sequential share bargaining model has received the entire remaining surplus, his sub-
game perfect equilibrium utility is indeterminate as it depends on the timing of the
acceptance by the remaining players, who are all indifferent. For one-dimensional
bargaining this corresponds to the case where the outcome is r.
A one-dimensional bargaining game is ˆ = (S, T, r, δ, i0, π(N )). When S and T
are both singletons, the game ˆ is a two-player game. The model in Rubinstein (1982)
with alternating offers is a special case.
To show that one-dimensional bargaining games have unique subgame perfect equi-
libria, we need the assumption of orderly voting, defined analogously to Definition 3.1.
Suppose the proposer belongs to coalition S. Then orderly voting means that all the
remaining players in S respond before all the players in T . Similarly, if the proposer
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belongs to coalition T, orderly voting means that all the remaining players in T
respond before all the players in S. A straightforward interpretation of the assumption
of orderly voting is that the proposer first consults the players in his own coalition,
before making the proposal to the other players.
Since members within a given coalition have identical preferences, it is tempting
to assume that they should adopt the same strategy. This reasoning is not correct, even
if one restricts attention to stationary strategies. The reason is that though preferences
are identical within a coalition, the transition probabilities π(N ) depend on the iden-
tity of the proposer, implying that different players of coalition S or T have different
positions in the bargaining game. As a consequence, different members of coalition
S or coalition T may find it optimal to make different proposals.
5 The characteristic equations for one-dimensional bargaining
In this section we derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game ˆ from the solu-
tion to a linear system of characteristic equations. In this and the next section, we drop
N from the notation π(N ).
For a player i in N and a coalition C ∈ {S, T }, the variable ziC denotes the con-
tinuation utility of a member of coalition C after the rejection of a proposal made by
player i in period 0. All members of a given coalition have the same preferences, so
receive the same utility in any outcome of the game. The characteristic equations of
ˆ describe a particular subgame perfect equilibrium in terms of the variables ziC . The
characteristic equations are as follows:










S, i ∈ N , (1)










S, i ∈ N , (2)
where πiC = ∑ j∈C πi j . This is a system with number of equations and unknowns
both equal to twice the cardinality of N . We will show that it has a unique solution
and that the solution is strictly positive.
The idea behind system (1)–(2) is that a proposal of any member of coalition
C ∈ {S, T } leaves any member of the rival coalition indifferent between acceptance
and rejection of the proposal. Thus, a player j ∈ S makes a proposal r − z jT . Such
a proposal makes all members of coalition T indifferent between acceptance and
rejection, since either action results in utility z jT . Similarly, a player j ∈ T makes a
proposal z jS . Such a proposal makes each member of S indifferent between acceptance
and rejection, since either action results in utility z jS .
Now suppose that the proposal of player i has been rejected. Then the continuation
utility of any member of coalition S is
∑
j∈S
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Setting this expression equal to ziS gives Eq. 2. In a similar way, we find that the








πi jδ(r − z jS).
Setting this expression equal to ziT gives Eq. 1.
Theorem 5.1 The system of characteristic Eqs. 1–2 has a unique solution and the
solution is strictly positive.
Proof Adding up Eqs. 1 and 2 for fixed i we obtain the equation ziT + ziS = δr . We
can therefore express each z jT as δr − z jS and substitute this into Eq. 2. This yields





S, i ∈ N . (3)
It is sufficient to show that system (3) has a unique solution. System (3) is a system
with number of equations and unknowns both equal to the cardinality of N . It can be
rewritten in vector-matrix notation as zS = δ(1 − δ)rπ·S + δπ zS . Because π is a row-
stochastic matrix, the spectral radius of π is at most 1. It follows that the matrix I −δπ
is invertible, where I is the identity matrix. The solution (I − δπ)−1δ(1 − δ)rπ·S is
therefore unique.
Since the matrix π is irreducible and 0 < δ < 1, it also holds that (I − δπ)−1 is a
positive matrix and πi S > 0 for some i ∈ N . It follows that δ(1 − δ)r(I − δπ)−1π·S
is a strictly positive vector, so zS is a strictly positive vector. An analogous argument
shows that zT is a strictly positive vector. 
unionsq
We define a profile of strategies σˆ = (σˆ i )i∈N and verify that it is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of ˆ. Let z be the solution to the system of characteristic Eqs. 1–2.
The behavioral strategy of a player i ∈ S is defined as follows. Whenever player i is
selected to make a proposal, he proposes xi = r − ziT , and whenever player i responds
to a proposal x j ∈ [0, r) of player j ∈ N , he accepts if and only if x j ≥ z jS . Whenever
player i responds to a proposal r of player j ∈ N in time period t, he accepts if and
only if the utility obtained when all remaining players accept r is greater than or equal
to δt z jS .
The behavioral strategy of a player i ∈ T is defined as follows. Whenever player i
is selected to make a proposal, he proposes xi = ziS, and whenever player i responds
to a proposal x j ∈ [0, r ] of player j ∈ N , he accepts if and only if x j ≤ r − z jT .
When players play according to strategy profile σˆ , bargaining proceeds as follows.
If player i0 belongs to S, he proposes xi0 = r − zi0T . By Theorem 5.1 it holds that
xi
0
< r. Since zi0S + zi
0




S , so as a consequence
all players in S accept. Players i ∈ T accept if and only if xi0 ≤ r − zi0T , an inequality
that holds with equality, so all players in T accept.
If player i0 belongs to T, bargaining proceeds in basically the same way. The
proposal xi0 equals zi0S , which is subsequently accepted by all the other players.
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Theorem 5.2 The strategy profile σˆ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game ˆ.
Proof Consider a subgame ˆ(h) of ˆ that starts after history h. Suppose a player
i ∈ N has a profitable deviation, which increases the subgame utility by ε > 0. Since
the utility player i can get from a node that is t periods later than the initial node of the
subgame is bounded by δt r, player i has a profitable deviation σ¯ i that deviates from
σˆ i only at nodes corresponding to the first T periods, where T is the smallest natural
number greater than (ln(ε) − ln(r))/ ln(δ).
Consider a node h′ where player i, when playing according to σ¯ i , deviates from
σˆ i , and which is not succeeded by another node where i deviates from σˆ i . Consider
the subsubgame ˆ(h′) starting at this node. Then either σ¯ i induces a profitable devi-
ation in the subsubgame, or the strategy σ˜ i that is equal to σ¯ i , except at h′, where
σ˜ i (h′) = σˆ i (h′), is a profitable deviation from σˆ i in subgame ˆ(h). Iterating this
argument, we can show that there is a subgame ˆ(h0) of ˆ such that player i acts at
node h0 and player i has a profitable deviation which only deviates from σˆ at h0.
Consider the subgame ˆ(h0) and let t be the corresponding period. We complete
the proof by showing that a one-shot deviation from σˆ i cannot be profitable.
Suppose player i ∈ S is a proposer in the first node of ˆ(h0). The use of strategy
σˆ i leads to a proposal xi = r − ziT , which is unanimously accepted by all responders,
and leads to utility δt (r − ziT ) for player i.
Proposing x > xi leads to rejection by a player in T . The utility of player i is
therefore equal to δt ziS . From δ
t ziS + δt ziT = δt+1r, it follows that δt ziS < δt (r − ziT ),
and player i looses utility by proposing x > xi .
Now consider a proposal x by i satisfying x < xi . If this proposal is accepted, it
leads to utility for i less than δt (r − ziT ). If it is rejected, then it will lead to utility
δt ziS, which is less than δ
t (r − ziT ).
Suppose player i ∈ T is a proposer in the first node of ˆ(h0). Then a fully analogous
argument shows that he does not have a profitable one-shot deviation.
Suppose player i ∈ S is a responder in the first node of ˆ(h0) and responds to a
proposal x ∈ [0, r) by a player j ∈ N . If i is asked to respond to this proposal, then
according to σˆ i acceptance takes place if x ≥ z jS, and results in utility equal to δt x
if all players responding after player i accept x or to δt z jS otherwise. A deviation to
rejection leads to utility δt z jS, and is therefore not profitable. If x < z jS, then player i
rejects the proposal when playing according to σˆ i , and obtains utility δt z jS . A deviation
from rejection to acceptance results in utility equal to δt x if all players responding
after player i accept x or to δt z jS otherwise, and is therefore not profitable.
Suppose player i ∈ S is a responder in the first node of ˆ(h0) and responds to
proposal r by a player j ∈ N . If i is asked to respond to this proposal, then according
to σˆ i acceptance takes place if the utility obtained when all remaining players accept
r is greater than or equal to δt z jS, and results in that utility if all players responding
after player i accept r or to δt z jS otherwise. A deviation to rejection leads to utility
δt z
j
S, and is therefore not profitable. If the utility obtained when all remaining players
accept r is less than δt z jS, then player i rejects the proposal when playing according to
σˆ i , and obtains utility δt z jS . A deviation from rejection to acceptance results in utility
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less than δt z jS if all players responding after player i accept r or to δt z
j
S otherwise, and
is therefore not profitable.
Suppose player i ∈ T is a responder in the first node ˆ(h0) and responds to a
proposal x ∈ [0, r ] by a player j ∈ N . Then a fully analogous argument shows that
he does not have a profitable one-shot deviation. 
unionsq
Example 5.1 Suppose coalition S is a singleton consisting of player i1, T ={i2, . . . , in},
and the identity of the proposer cycles within the player set: i1, . . . , in, i1. The system
of characteristic Eqs. 1–2 yields





S , j = 2, . . . , n − 1,
zinS = δr − δzi1T .
Solving it, we find
zi1T =
δ − δn
1 − δn r,
so the equilibrium proposal of player i1 equals
xi1 = r − zi1T =
1 − δ
1 − δn r.
This proposal will be accepted by all players in equilibrium. The equilibrium utility
of player i1 is
1 − δ
1 − δn r
and the equilibrium utility of players in T is
δ − δn
1 − δn r.
Since 1 − δ does not necessarily exceed δ − δn, the equilibrium utility of the first
mover, player i1, may be lower than that of the players in T .
In subgames (that will not be reached in equilibrium) where a player ik , k =
2, . . . , n, has to make a proposal, ik proposes
xik = δn−k+1 1 − δ
1 − δn r,
which equals δn−k+1 times the proposal of player i1.
In a subgame where player i2 makes a proposal, he may propose a low value of x,
since a long time will elapse before a player belonging to the opposing coalition can
make a proposal. In a subgame where player in makes a proposal, in knows that player
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i1 will be the next proposer, so in proposes a relatively high value of x . Observe that
we obtain the Rubinstein (1982) result for the case where n = 2.
If, for fixed δ, the number of players n goes to infinity, then the equilibrium proposal
of player i1 converges to (1 − δ)r , the proposal of player i2 to 0, and the proposal of
player in to δ(1 − δ)r . If, for a fixed number of players, δ converges to 1, then the
equilibrium proposals of all players converge to r/n.
Example 5.2 Suppose the coalition S consists of k players and the coalition T of n−k
players. Each player is selected with probability 1/n as the proposer. For i ∈ N , the














































The equilibrium proposal of a player i ∈ S equals
xi = r − ziT = δ
k
n
r + (1 − δ)r.
This proposal will be accepted by all players in equilibrium. The equilibrium proposal
of a player i ∈ T is given by
xi = δ k
n
r.
The larger the ratio k/n, the higher the fraction of players belonging to coalition S,
and the higher the proposed value of x .
If the initial proposer is also chosen randomly with equal probabilities, the expected







r + (1 − δ)r
)








Also the expected proposal is equal to (k/n)r . The expected utility of a player i ∈ T
equals ((n − k)/n)r .
If, for fixed δ and a fixed size of coalition S, the number of players in T goes to
infinity, then the equilibrium proposal of players in S converges to (1 − δ)r , and the
proposal of players in T converges to 0. If, for fixed δ and a fixed size of coalition T ,
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the number of players in S goes to infinity, then the equilibrium proposal of players
in S converges to r , and the proposal of players in T converges to δr . If, for a fixed
number of players, δ converges to 1, then the equilibrium proposals of all players
converge to (k/n)r . 
unionsq
6 Uniqueness of equilibrium in one-dimensional bargaining games
In this section we show that subgame perfect equilibrium utilities are unique, and
therefore correspond to the ones following from σˆ .
For i ∈ N , for t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, let ˆi t denote the class of subgames of the game ˆ
starting in period t with player i in the role of the proposer. For i ∈ N , t ∈ {0, 1, . . .},
and C ∈ {S, T }, let uitC (uitC ) be the infimum (supremum) of the utilities to coalition
C over all subgame perfect equilibria of games in ˆi t . Let zitC (zitC ) be the infimum(supremum) of the continuation utilities to coalition C following the rejection of a
proposal by player i in period t over all subgame perfect equilibria of games in ˆi t .
The following result asserts that, for i ∈ N , for C ∈ {S, T }, ui0C = u¯i0C , and
zi0C = z¯i0C . This result implies that subgame perfect equilibrium utilities are unique.
Theorem 6.1 Let ˆ be a one-dimensional bargaining game with orderly voting. For
any ˆ, for i ∈ N and C ∈ {S, T }, ui0C = u¯i0C and zi0C = z¯i0C . In any subgame perfect
equilibrium, agreement is reached without delay.
Proof First we establish the following inequalities. For t ∈ {0, 1, . . .} it holds that
zitS ≤ uitS ≤ uitS ≤ zitS , i ∈ T,
δt r − zitS ≤ uitT ≤ uitT ≤ δt r − zitS , i ∈ T,
and
zitT ≤ uitT ≤ uitT ≤ zitT , i ∈ S,
δt r − zitT ≤ uitS ≤ uitS ≤ δt r − zitT , i ∈ S.
The inequality zitS ≤ uitS follows from the fact that when a player of coalition S rejects
a proposal of player i ∈ T in period t, he obtains a utility of at least zitS . His subgame
perfect equilibrium utility can therefore not be less than zitS . By a similar argument it
follows that zitT ≤ uitT for i ∈ S.
Let (vi tS , v
i t
T ) be subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of a game in ˆi t . Then v
i t
S ≤
δt r −vi tT , where the inequality comes from the fact that there might be delay before an
agreement is reached. As a consequence, uitS ≤ δt r − uitT , which yields the inequality
uitS ≤ δt r − zitT for i ∈ S.
Now suppose that in period t player i ∈ T makes a proposal x ∈ (zitS /δt , r). Notice
that obviously zitS ≤ δt+1r, so x can indeed be chosen in this way. We will argue that in
a subgame perfect equilibrium this leads to utility of at least δt (r − x) to i, and there-
fore to all players in T . The assumption of orderly voting implies that first the players
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in T respond, say in the order i1, . . . , ik, next the players in S, say in the sequence
j1, . . . , j. If player j is given the option to respond, it means that all other players
have accepted the proposal. If player j accepts, his utility is δt x, otherwise it is at
most zitS < δ
t x . Player j will accept therefore. By a backwards induction argument
it follows that all players j1, . . . , j will accept the proposal. Consider next player ik .
Acceptance by player ik leads to utility δt (r − x), rejection will therefore only occur
if it leads to utility at least equal to δt (r − x), so in any case the utility to any player
in T is at least δt (r − x). By a backwards induction argument it follows that player
i1, the first to respond, can ensure a utility of at least δt (r − x) by accepting x . Thus,
player i can guarantee himself a utility of at least δt (r − x) for any x ∈ (zitS /δt , r)
by proposing x . This shows that uitT ≥ δt (r − zitS /δt ) = δt r − zitS . The inequality
uitS ≤ δt r − uitT ≤ zitS for i ∈ T follows.
All the remaining inequalities follow by a symmetric argument.
The above inequalities imply that for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, C ∈ {S, T }, and i ∈ C,
uitN\C − uitN\C ≤ zitN\C − zitN\C ,
uitC − uitC ≤ δt r − zitN\C − δt r + zitN\C = zitN\C − zitN\C .
For t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, we define
	t = max{zitC − zitC : i ∈ N , C ∈ {S, T }}.
Since rejection of a proposal by player i ∈ N in period t leads to a subgame in ˆ j,t+1















zitC − zitC ≤
∑
j∈N
πi j	t+1 = 	t+1
and therefore that 	t ≤ 	t+1. Iterating this inequality we obtain 	t ≤ 	t+m for
every m ∈ N. On the other hand, 	t ≤ δt r, so in particular, 	t ≤ δt+mr for every
m ∈ N. It follows that 	t = 0.
We have shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium utility levels of all players
are unique. By Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium utility
levels are strictly positive and sum up to r, so agreement is reached without delay in
all subgame perfect equilibria. 
unionsq
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In general, ˆ may have more than one subgame perfect equilibrium, but the mul-
tiplicity is inessential in the following sense. Assume for instance that coalition S
consists of two players, i1 and i2, and suppose that the players respond to proposals
in this order. If a player j in T makes a proposal smaller than z jS, the players in S
will reject this proposal in any subgame perfect equilibrium. It is completely irrele-
vant, however, whether this proposal will be rejected by i1, or whether i1 accepts this
proposal and has it rejected by i2. In fact, even a member of T different from j may
reject the, from his perspective, very favorable proposal, anticipating that some player
in S will reject it anyway. What matters is not the responses by individual players, but
how the coalition S ∪ T \{ j} reacts to proposals.
Let H be the set of all decision nodes of the extensive form game ˆ. We denote the
decision nodes where some player has to make a proposal by Hp, and the decision
nodes immediately following nodes in Hp, so nodes where the first player responds,
by H r. Given a strategy profile σ, for h ∈ Hp, σ p(h) denotes the proposal made at
decision node h, and for h ∈ H r, σ r(h) = 1 if the proposal is accepted by all players,
and σ r(h) = 0, otherwise.
Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile. It is not hard to show that σ
is essentially equivalent to σˆ in the following sense. For any h ∈ Hp, σ p(h) = σˆ p(h).
For any h ∈ H r where the proposal under discussion is x by player j ∈ S, if x = z jS,
thenσ r(h) = σˆ r(h).For any h ∈ H r where the proposal under discussion is x by player
j ∈ T, if x = r − z jT , then σ r(h) = σˆ r(h). Subgame perfect equilibrium proposals
are therefore unique. Only in subgames where by mistake a player j ∈ S proposes
x j = z jS, so leaving players in his own coalition indifferent between accepting and
rejecting, or in subgames where by mistake a player j ∈ T proposes x j = r − z jT ,
so leaving players in his own coalition indifferent between accepting and rejecting,
could there be a difference in response behavior at the coalition level.
Let ˆ(r) be a one-dimensional bargaining game with surplus size r . Consider any
subgame perfect equilibrium of ˆ(r). The continuation utility of a member of coali-
tion C after rejecting a proposal by player i in period 0 is ziC (r). The variable uiC (r)
denotes the expected utility of a member of coalition C in a subgame starting with a
proposal by player i in period 0. The next result specifies how these variables can be
computed, and claims that all utilities are linear functions of r . The latter property is
crucial to derive our results for sequential share bargaining games.
Theorem 6.2 For r > 0, let ˆ(r) be a one-dimensional bargaining game with orderly
voting. Consider any subgame perfect equilibrium of ˆ(r). Then (ziS(r), ziT (r))i∈N
are given by the solution to (1)–(2). Moreover, we have that
uiS(r) = r − ziT (r), uiT (r) = ziT (r), i ∈ S,
uiS(r) = ziS(r), uiT (r) = r − ziS(r), i ∈ T .
For i ∈ N and C ∈ {S, T }, the utility uiC (r) is linear in r and it holds that uiC (r) > 0.
Proof The expressions above follow in a straightforward way from Theorems 5.2 and
6.1. It follows from the proof of Theorem 5.1 that the solution to system (3) is given
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by zS(r) = δ(1 − δ)r(I − δπ)−1π·S . It follows that zS(r) is linear in r. Since, for
i ∈ N , ziT (r) = r − ziS(r), it holds that ziT (r) is linear in r. Linearity of uS(r) and
uT (r) is now immediate.
Since for all i ∈ N and C ∈ {S, T } obviously ziC (r) ≤ δr, and ziC (r) > 0 by
Theorem 5.1, the above formulae imply that uiC (r) > 0. 
unionsq
7 Uniqueness of equilibrium in sequential share bargaining games
In this section we prove that sequential share bargaining games have unique subgame
perfect equilibrium utilities.
A subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile σ ∗ of  is defined as follows.
Consider a subgame with state (R, x−R, t, a, i). Set S = {a}, T = R \ {a}, r =
X − ∑ j∈N\R x j . Let ziC for i ∈ N and C ∈ {S, T } denote the solution to the system
(1)–(2) of characteristic equations. Whenever the state is (R, x−R, t, a, a), player a
makes the proposal xa = r − zaT and each player j ∈ T accepts a proposal x of player
a if and only if x ≤ r − zaT . Whenever the state is (R, x−R, t, a, i) for i ∈ R\{a},
player i makes the proposal xa = ziS , each player j ∈ T accepts a proposal x of player
i if and only if x ≤ r − ziT , and player a accepts a proposal x of player i if and only
if x ≥ ziS . In particular, equilibrium proposals are unanimously accepted.
Theorem 7.1 Let  be a sequential share bargaining game with orderly voting. Then
the strategy profile σ ∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game . The subgame
perfect equilibrium utilities of  are unique. In any subgame perfect equilibrium,
agreement is reached without delay.
Proof We show first that the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of  are uniquely
determined. The proof is by induction on the number of players remaining on the
agenda in the subgames. We use the notation u(s) for a subgame perfect equilibrium
utility vector of a game in (s). Subgames for which there is still some surplus left to be
divided, i.e.
∑
j∈N\R x j < X will have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities.
In other subgames, the players in R receive equilibrium utility 0, but are indifferent
between accepting and rejecting proposals, causing a multiplicity of subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities for the players j ∈ N\R. The latter utilities are obviously bounded
from above by δt x j . Subgames without a positive remaining surplus are never reached
on the equilibrium path.
Let s = ({i}, x−{i}, t, i, i) and consider a game in (s). It obviously holds that
ui (s) = δt (X − ∑ j∈N\{i} x j ).
Consider a non-empty R ⊂ N with cardinality m < n and a, i ∈ R. Assume we
have shown that for each k ∈ R there exists a constant cR,a,i,k > 0 such that for all
x−R with
∑
j∈N\R x j < X and for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, uk(R, x−R, t, a, i) = δt (X −∑
j∈N\R x j )cR,a,i,k, and for j ∈ N \ R it holds that u j (R, x−R, t, a, i) = δt x j . The
constant cR,a,i,k is equal to player k’s subgame perfect equilibrium utility of a sequen-
tial share bargaining subgame in (R, x−R, 0, a, i) with a remaining surplus of size
1. Though not important for the remainder, it therefore holds that
∑
k∈R cR,a,i,k = 1.
Consider now a non-empty R ⊂ N with cardinality m+1 and a, i ∈ R. We analyze
the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of a game in (s) with s = (R, x−R, t, a, i).
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We define R′ = R\{a}. If the players unanimously agree to allocate xa of the sur-
plus to player a in period t ′ ≥ t, then the players enter a game in (s′), where
s′ = (R′, x−R′ , t ′, a′, i ′), with probability ρa′(R′)π0i ′(R′). Replacing every subgame
of (s) following the acceptance of a proposal xa in period t ′ by the weighted
average of subgame perfect equilibrium utility vectors of the games in (s′) with
weights ρa′(R′)π0i ′(R
′) yields a reduced game denoted by ˆ(s). We argue that ˆ(s) is
strategically equivalent to a one-dimensional bargaining game whenever
∑
j∈N\R x j <
X. To show this, we only have to verify that the preferences over terminal nodes of the
reduced game ˆ(s) are affine transformation of those of a one-dimensional bargaining
game.
Define r = X −∑ j∈N\R x j and assume r > 0. If in the reduced game ˆ(s) the share
xa ∈ [0, r) is allocated in period t ′ to player a, then we use the induction hypothesis






′)δt ′ xa = δt ′ xa,
















If in the reduced game ˆ(s) the share xa = r is allocated in period t ′ to player a, then
the expected utility to player a is less than or equal to δt ′ xa and the expected utility to
player k ∈ R\{a} is 0. The factor ∑a′∈R′ ∑i ′∈R′ ρa′(R′)π0i ′(R′)cR′,a′,i ′,k is positive
by the induction hypothesis. The utility to player a is therefore proportional to δt ′−t xa
for xa ∈ [0, r) and the utility to a player k ∈ R\{a} is proportional to δt ′−t (r − xa)
for xa ∈ [0, r ].
We conclude that the game ˆ(s) is a one-dimensional bargaining game as defined
in Sect. 4, with coalitions S = {a} and T = R\{a}. Thus Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 apply
to show that the reduced game ˆ(s) and therefore the game (s) has unique subgame
perfect equilibrium utilities. For each k ∈ R there exists a constant cR,a,i,k > 0 such
that for all x−R with
∑
j∈N\R x j < X and for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, uk(R, x−R, t, a, i) =
δt (X −∑ j∈N\R x j )cR,a,i,k, and for j ∈ N\R it holds that u j (R, x−R, t, a, i) = δt x j .
This completes the induction hypothesis and shows that the game  has uniquely deter-
mined subgame perfect equilibrium utilities and in any subgame perfect equilibrium,
agreement is reached without delay. 
unionsq
In general,  may have more than one subgame perfect equilibrium. Since each
subgame of  can be reduced to a one-dimensional bargaining game, the multiplic-
ity is inessential in exactly the same way as for one-dimensional bargaining games.
When the set of players remaining on the agenda is N and a proposal is made which
is unacceptable to some of the players, it does not matter which player in N rejects
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the proposal. The collective response to a proposal is uniquely determined, except in
states (R, x−R, t, a, i) with |R| ≥ 3 and i ∈ T = R \{a}, when player i proposes
x = X −∑ j∈N\R x j − ziT , so leaving players in his own coalition indifferent between
accepting and rejecting x . The other case where aggregate behavior was not uniquely
determined in one-dimensional bargaining, where in the state (R, x−R, t, a, a) by mis-
take player a proposes x = zaS , does not occur in sequential share bargaining, since
player a does not have any coalition members. Such a proposal would be accepted in
all subgame perfect equilibria by the members of T .
Example 7.1 Consider a sequential share bargaining game  where N = {1, . . . , n}.
We assume that the order in which players appear on the agenda is deterministic
and is given by the sequence 1, . . . , n. Moreover, we assume that when the set of
players remaining on the agenda is {k, . . . , n}, player k is the first player to make a
proposal. Thereafter the identity of the proposer cycles clockwise within the player
set: k, . . . , n, k. Thus whenever the set of players remaining on the agenda is R =
{k, . . . , n}, ρk(R) = 1 and π0k (R) = 1.
We know that all equilibrium proposals are immediately accepted. This means that
the equilibrium proposal xk of player k, when player k is on the agenda, is also player
k’s equilibrium utility.
Consider the subgame (Rk, x−Rk , 0, k, k) reached on the equilibrium path, where
the set of players remaining on the agenda is Rk = {k, . . . , n}. Let nk = n − k + 1 be
the cardinality of the set Rk and let rk = X −∑ j∈N\Rk x j denote the remainder of the
surplus. The reduced game ˆ(Rk, x−Rk , 0, k, k) is the one-dimensional bargaining
game of Example 5.1 with S = {k} and T = {k + 1, . . . , n}. It follows from Example
5.1 that the equilibrium proposal of player k is
xk = 1 − δ
1 − δnk rk .
When player k receives his share the surplus size shrinks to
rk+1 = rk − xk = δ − δ
nk
1 − δnk rk .
Solving this system of recursive equations gives
rk = δ
k−1 − δn
1 − δn X.
Thus the equilibrium proposal of player k, which is also the share of the surplus
received by him, is
xk = δ
k−1 − δk
1 − δn X.
Example 7.2 Consider the sequential share bargaining game,where N = {1, . . . , n}.
As in the previous example the sequence in which the players’ shares are determined
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is 1, . . . , n. The proposer is chosen randomly from the set of players remaining on the
agenda according to the uniform probability distribution.
Consider a subgame (Rk, x−Rk , 0, k, i) reached on the equilibrium path, where
the set of players remaining on the agenda is Rk = {k, . . . , n}. Let nk = n − k + 1
be the cardinality of the set Rk and let rk = X − ∑ j∈N\Rk x j denote the remainder of
the surplus. The reduced game ˆ(Rk, x−Rk , 0, k, i) is the one-dimensional bargaining
game of Example 5.2 with S = {k} and T = {k + 1, . . . , n}. It follows from Example
5.2 that the equilibrium proposal of player i is
xi =
{
δ(rk/nk) + (1 − δ)rk, if i = k,
δ(rk/nk), if i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n¯}.
Since by assumption the proposer is chosen according to the uniform probability




xi = rk/nk .
It follows that the expected size of the surplus left for the players in the set Rk+1,
conditional on the current remainder being rk, is given by
E(rk+1 | rk) = rk − rk/nk = n − k
n − k + 1rk,
from which it follows that
E(rk+1) = n − k
n − k + 1E(rk).
We now have a system of recursive equations which together with the initial condi-
tion r1 = X gives E(rk) = (nk/n)X . The expected share of the surplus received by
player k is therefore X/n. Since all equilibrium proposals are accepted, this is also
the expected utility of player k. 
unionsq
8 Conclusions
The existing results on n-player bargaining problems with unanimous agreement point
towards a large multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. There are, however, sev-
eral ways to extend the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model for 2 players to the case
with n players. This paper considers the case where the shares of the players are not
determined simultaneously, but sequentially, thereby removing a potential source of
multiplicity of equilibria.
The paper obtains unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for this bargain-
ing protocol. In equilibrium, proposals are accepted without delay. Our results for n
players are qualitatively the same as the results for the two player case. The paper
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also studies a related class of bargaining problems, called one-dimensional bargaining
problems, and obtains a uniqueness result there as well.
Our results imply that the choice of the bargaining protocol is important in obtaining
desirable bargaining outcomes. The idea of determining the players’ shares sequen-
tially is natural, and avoids the coordination problem that occurs when all shares are
determined at the same time.
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